Abstract. This paper aims at exploring the relationship between the corporate performance and compensation gaps of executive-staff, by using the samples of Chinese firms from Shanghai Stock Exchange over the period of 2005-2015. We measured the corporate performance by computing the return on equity. And we also used the average compensation of the top three executives divided by the average of the ordinary employees to quantify the compensation gap. Ultimately, we conclude that there is a significant "inverse U" relationship between the compensation gap and the corporate performance.
Introduction
The relationship between the compensation gap of executive-staff has raised widespread concerns in China. Compared with the ordinary staff, executives bear much greater responsibility and risk, that is why the executives gain more salaries than the ordinary ones. As to the executives, a higher level of compensation can also reduce agency cost to a certain extent. The executives pursue their own interests as well as to realize the maximization of the value of shareholders. However, the ordinary staff play a fundamental role in the development of the enterprise that any executives cannot ignore the staff's interests. If the compensation gap is too huge, this may deter their working spirit and cause the inefficiency of the corporate government.
What gap is appropriate in order to improve the corporate's efficiency and make the working environment be fair?
Literature Review
There exist two theories about the gap between the executives' compensation and the staff' compensation. One is called "Tournament Theory", and the other is called "Behavioral Theory". They both have empirically supports accordingly.
"Tournament Theory" (Lazear & Rosen, 1981 )is based on the agency problem of the modern corporate [1, 2] . The key inference from tournament theory is that it is efficient to pay the winner considerably more than the losers in this internal labor market competition, even if the winner is only marginally better than the losers. It emphasizes that job hierarchy provides incentives to staff and firms use promotions as a mechanism of rewarding strong employee performance. Based on classical marginal productivity theory of labor, differences in the compensation levels of CEOs and other senior executives can simply reflect differences in their marginal contributions to firm performance. Executives differ significantly from each other in their abilities, managerial skills, and position specific experience, which can all affect their overall productivity. Large compensation will induce staff to work harder to increase their chance of getting be promoted. Rosen (1985) adds "The Continuous Selection Theory" [3] . He thank that the compensation gap should be bigger when the position level is much higher, which will do well in corporate motivation. A few supportive empirical studies include Main, O'Reilly, and Eriksson (1999) , and Bognanno (2001) , who find that more competitors increases the compensation gap between a CEO and lower level executives [4, 5] . Kale et al (2009) document that events lowering non-CEO executives' promotion probabilities are associated with larger compensation gaps [6] .
Different from the theory which we just mentioned above, "Behavioral Theory" emphasis more on the fairness. The compensation gap will lead to the dissatisfaction of the staff. Once the staff feel be exploited owing to the compensation gap, they will act negatively with cynicism (Cowherd & Levine, 1992) [7] .Social comparison theory shows that the small wage gap and competition can encourage staff to strengthen the team cooperation, as well as promote the performance of the organization.
Hypothesis Development and Data

Hypothesis Development
According to Dujonet al., (2004), the big compensation gap can reduce the agancy cost efficiently, which is important to motivate executives and staff to work hard in order to get a better promotion [8] . Based on the perspective I mentioned above, the first hypothesis is that:
H1:The gap between the executives' compensation and the staff's compensation is positively associated with the corporate performance.
On the contrary, a theory that it is not the external market environment or the characteristics of the corporate operation ,but the the defect of corporate governance structure that influence the compensation gap in China (Lin et al., 2003) [9] . That meansTournament Theory or Behavioral Theory can not simply explain the relationship between the compensation gap and the corporate performance.So the second hypothesis in this paper is that:
H2: The gap between theexecutives' compensation and the staff'scompensationis nonlinear associated with the corporate performance.
Data Selection
Majority of data in this paper comes from China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR).
The firms, which are viewed as financial companies or Special Treatment Stock by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), are excluded in this study. Because, the former are different in accounting disclosure policy and the later are academically meaningless for this study. Mean while, those samples which miss the dependent variables, independent variables, or control variables are excluded. Ultimately, there are 2471firms and 15372 observations available to investigate the model.
To maintain the accuracy of the data, we also choose some random samples from all the data in this paper to compare with the annual report data of listed companies.
Research Methodology Data Description
We constructed a balanced panel data set comprising 2471 firms spanning a period of 11 years (2005 to 2015).
The independent variable is calculated as follow: First, I sum up all the top three executives' compensation, and then divided by three to get the average of the executives' compensation. Then I plus cash pay for the worker and the payroll payable together then minus the top three executives' compensation to get the total general staff's compensation. Then I make the total number of staff minus three to get the total number of the general staff. At last, I make the total compensation of the general staff be divided by the total number of the general staff to get the average of general staff's compensation.
And the description of independent varibels, dependent variables and control variables are noted in Table 1 below. 
Estimation of Models
Model (1) and model (2) are the models for estimating the association between the gap and the corporate performance.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table2 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the independent variables,dependent variables and the control variables. The mean of Roe, Gap, Gap 2 , Size,Lev,Dual are 0.127, 6.827, 97.780, 21.655,0.515and 0.783 respectively.The standard deviation of Size is 1.331, which means that the listed companies have an uniform size distribution. As to the Lev, there exist a huge gap between the minimum and the maximum, which means that the listed companies pay much attention to the use of financial leverage in their corporate government. Table 3 illustrates the correlation matrix of theindependent variables, dependent variables and the control variables. The correlation matrixes of all the variables in the models are demonstrated in Table 3 . Just like the expectation, Roe is positively associative with Gap, which is consistent with the Tournament Theory (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001 ) [10] . But Roe is negatively associative with . Furthermore, we find that those control variables: Size, Lev, Dual,which stand for the size of the listed firms, , the financial leverage of the listed firms, the concurrentpost situation of the listed firms are all following with the theory mentioned above. Moreover, according to the correlation matrix, there is no multi-collinearity. Consequently, the result of correlation matrix suggests that we can continue our study to the regression analyst. Regression Results Table 4 represents the regression results of this study. We use the least-square to estimate the parameters for each model. In model (1), Gap has a significant positive relationship with Roe, which means that the returen on equity will rise according to the rise of the compsenation gap between the executives and the staff . The result is consist with the Tournament Theory. In model (2), at first ,the corporate's performance is significantly positive with the compersation gap. But while the gap rise dramaticly, the return on asset will decline. This can explainthe properly compsention gap will inhance the employees' motivation to work hard to get better treat, but if the gap is too huge , the staff will feel unfair, and induce the neagtive effect on the corporate performance.Thus we get the conclusion that the relationship present to be a U-sharp. Therefore, the investigation results in model (1) and model (2) are consistent with H1 and H2 respectively. The values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Correlation Matrix
Summary
In this paper, we explore the role played by the compensation gap between the executives and the general staff in market. In our principal agent problem, we can find that the properly compensation will reduce the agent cost and inspire the staff's working will. This kind of incentive will boost the corporate performance. But as we can see above, the relationship between the compensation gap and the return on asset present to be non-liner, producing a curve shaped like an upside-down U. It means that there exists a limit of the compensation gap. If the gap is under the limit, the bigger the gap is, the better performance of the corporate is.
